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ABSTRACT. The paper discusses valuation issues in the context of climate change im-
pact estimation. Issues addressed are aggregation of damage costs over diverse regions
(particularly equity-weighting), differentiation of per-unit values, willingness to pay
versus willingness to accept compensation as a basis for valuation, and accountability for
impacts. Numerical illustrations show that the damage cost estimates are quite sensitive
to the assumptions made on these issues.
1. Introduction
A reasonable understanding of the likely impacts of climate change on
human welfare is crucial for making an informed decision about the best
response strategy to the enhanced greenhouse effect. For this reason, the
Second Assessment Report (SAR) of the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC) has paid particular attention to the study of im-
pacts. Working Group II has extensively reviewed the literature on the
physical impacts of climate change (Watson et al., 1996).
However, in the view of some decision makers it is useful, and for some
decision support tools it is necessary, to aggregate the vast number of de-
tailed regional and sector-specific estimates to a more tractable set of
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numbers. Money is the most commonly chosen numeraire for this type of
aggregation exercise, partly for reasons of convenience and partly because
of the internal logical consistency of monetization based on the theory of
human preference measurement. Monetization also has the advantage of
expressing impacts in the same units of measurement as the cost of re-
sponse measures, which in turn facilitates the comparison of the costs and
benefits (avoided impact) of emission control. IPCC has responded to this
need also, and the ‘Social Costs Chapter’ (Chapter 6) of the Working Group
III SAR has reviewed the available monetary assessments of climate
change impact (Pearce et al., 1996).
The chapter on social costs was among the most controversial chapters
of the entire SAR. Partly this was no doubt due to the still low quality of
most estimates—a fact which is clearly recognized and emphasized in the
chapter. Partly, it may also have had to do with presentation. Early drafts
of the chapter were perhaps too heavy on academic jargon and could
easily be, and were, misinterpreted by some. Many, perhaps most, of the
original critics objected to the IPCC figures mainly because they felt that
damage had been underestimated, without querying valuation as such.
Others fundamentally opposed the notion of economic valuation and
questioned its usefulness and ethical underpinnings. Particularly contro-
versial was the valuation of climate-change-induced mortality risk.
This paper is one in a series prepared by some of the lead authors of
IPCC WG III, Chapter 6. Fankhauser and Tol (1997) present impact figures
consistently corrected for purchasing power parity. Fankhauser and Tol
(1996) discuss recent methodological advances and trends emerging in
work published since the finalization of the SAR. Tol and Fankhauser
(1997) review the state of the art of climate change impact representations
in integrated assessment models, extending beyond the static portrait
painted in the social cost chapter. Fankhauser et al. (1997) discuss some
welfare-theoretic foundation for damage aggregation and comparison and
present aggregates for a wider range of ethical positions than the restricted
utilitarian approach adopted in IPCC WG3 Chapter 6. Finally, Pearce
(1997) and Tol (1997) ask what kinds of action on climate change would be
dictated if the information on costs and benefits in the SAR were brought
together into a cost–benefit framework.
The present paper discusses the pros and cons of the economic valuation
of climate change impacts and of various approaches that have been
suggested as an alternative to the literature reflected in the IPCC report.
Even though not all of these alternatives have an equally firm foundation
in economics or ethics, we have recalculated impact estimates for most of
them in order to illustrate the sensitivity of impact estimates to such as-
sumptions. Surprisingly, many of the alternative calculations lead to
results that we would consider to be within the range of error of the initial
figures. In other cases, monetized impact estimates are substantially
higher.
In the course of the paper, we touch upon many issues in climate
change, economic theory and policy, ethics and decision theory without
developing any of them in particular depth. Rather, we deal with these
questions as they specifically relate to the issue of climate change impact
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valuation; readers with a general interest in these topics are referred to the
specialized literature. In doing so, we hope to reintroduce the theoretical
basis to an important policy debate that has got somewhat out of hand at
times. At the same time, the example of climate change can provide some
generic insights on the issue of economic valuation of global externalities
in general.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the econ-
omic assessment of climate change impacts as presented in Pearce et al.
(1996). Section 3 addresses some of the main technical/methodological
issues regarding valuation that were raised in the debate on the chapter. In
particular, it deals with the choice between willingness to pay (WTP) and
willingness to accept (WTA), the extrapolation of local case-study esti-
mates to other regions and the question of equity weights. Perhaps the
most fiercely debated issue, however, has been the valuation of climate-
change-induced mortality risk, and the use of regionally differentiated
per-unit damage estimates—a notion that follows directly from the logic of
WTP/WTA. Section 4 discusses some of the methods that have been put
forward to avoid regional differentiation. Another recurring theme has
been the claim that monetary impact estimates are redundant and un-
necessary for decision making. Section 5 addresses this claim and
discusses what role social cost estimates may play in international decision
making. Conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Climate change damage costs
The scientific research on global warming impacts has focused predomi-
nantly on the so-called ‘2 3 CO2’ benchmark, that is, a scenario with an
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentration equivalent to twice the prein-
dustrial CO2 level. Despite the arbitrariness and limited policy relevance of
this scenario, a large part of the social cost chapter in the IPCC Second
Assessment Report (SAR) (Pearce et al., 1996) is consequently also devoted
to 2 3 CO2 damage since the IPCC rules of conduct require that authors
focus on existing, and ideally peer-reviewed and published, material. A
climate change associated with a doubling of the atmospheric concen-
tration of carbon diode equivalents is expected to occur in the middle of
the next century if no substantial emission reductions are realized.
Information on the impacts of global warming is available for several re-
gions and countries. The best studied regions are developed countries, in
particular the United States, where climate change impacts have been
analysed in a series of studies, following initial work by Smith and Tirpak
(1989). The most prominent US studies are made comparable by Smith
(1996). The most recent US study is by Mendelsohn and Neumann (1997),
which is, however, largely restricted to market sectors. Other OECD re-
gional studies include CRU/ERL (1992) for the European Union (updated
by Plambeck and Hope, 1996); Parry and Duncan (1995) for the United
Kingdom; and Nishioka et al. (1993) for Japan. In the context of an Asian
Development Bank (1992) project on climate change in Asia, global warm-
ing impacts have also been analysed for a number of Asian countries.
Stzrepek and Smith (1995) contains case studies for Africa, Latin America
and Asia.
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Climate change is expected to affect a wide range of sectors, including
agriculture, coastal zones, energy supply and demand, water resources, in-
frastructure, leisure, migration, human health, human mortality and
unmanaged ecosystems. Studies usually deal with only a subset of these
impacts and are often restricted to a description of impacts in physical
terms. Estimates generally combine, but do not neatly separate the costs of
adaptation (such as sea-level-rise protection) and the costs of residual
damages (such as the inundation of unprotected areas). See Tol et al. (1997)
for more discussion and an attempt to single out adaptation costs.
By far the best studied impact categories are agricultural impacts (e.g.,
Rosenzweig and Parry, 1994; Adams et al., 1994; Darwin et al., 1995;
Schimmelpfennig et al., 1996; Reilly et al., 1996) and the costs of sea level
rise (e.g., Fankhauser, 1995b; Turner et al., 1995; Yohe et al., 1995, 1996;
Bijlsma et al., 1996). Attempts at a comprehensive monetary quantification
of all impacts are relatively rare, and usually restricted to the United States
(Cline, 1992; Nordhaus, 1991; Titus, 1992). Preliminary estimates of mone-
tary impacts in different world regions are provided by Fankhauser
(1995a), Tol (1995), and, subsequent to the finalization of the SAR,
Mendelsohn et al. (1996). The Fankhauser and Tol figures, which were at
the core of the IPCC assessment (Pearce et al., 1996), are reproduced in
Table 1.
Fankhauser and Tol (1997) have recalculated the initial set of estimates
consistently correcting for purchasing power parity and using the same
benefit transfer methodology throughout. The results are reproduced in
Table 2. The effect is to raise non-OECD damages by about 40–60 per cent,
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Table 1. Annual monetized 2 3 CO2 damage costs in different world regions
Fankhauser Tol
bn$ %GDPa bn$ %GDPa
European Union 63.6 1.4
United States 61.0 1.3
Other OECD 55.9 1.4
OECD America 74.2 1.5
OECD Europe 56.5 1.3
OECD Pacific 59.0 2.8
Total OECD 180.5 1.3 189.5 1.6
E. Europe/Former USSR 18.2b 0.7b 27.9 20.3
Centrally Planned Asia 16.7c 4.7c 18.0 5.2
South and South East Asia 53.5 8.6
Africa 30.3 8.7
Latin America 31.0 4.3
Middle East 1.3 4.1
Total Non-OECD 89.1 1.6 126.2 2.7
World 269.6 1.4 315.7 1.9
a Note that the GDP base may differ between the studies
b Former Soviet Union only
c China only
Source: Pearce et al. (1996), based on Fankhauser (1995a), and Tol (1995).
and global damages by 15–20 per cent. Based on these and other available
figures, Pearce et al. (1996) suggest the following aggregate impact esti-
mates for 2 3 CO2:
World damage: 1.5 to 2.0 per cent of world GNP
Developed country damage: 1.0 to 1.5 per cent of national GNP
Developing country damage: 2.0 to 9.0 per cent of national GNP.
Pearce et al. (1996) stress the preliminary character of these estimates. In
particular, it should be noted that the above figures are best-guess esti-
mates. The range does not reflect a confidence interval, but the variation of
estimates found in the literature.
There is a considerable range of error which has not been quantified. The
chapter also notes that:
• A large number of likely impacts could not be measured or could only
be partially measured. This is particularly the case for non-market
damages.
• Figures on developing countries, because they are often based on ap-
proximation and extrapolation, are clearly less reliable than those for
developed regions.
• As best-guess estimates, the figures neglect the possibility of impact
surprises (such as social and political unrest) and of low probability/
high impact events (such as a shut down of the ocean conveyor belt).
• To avoid long-term predictions, damage figures measure the impact of
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Table 2. Annual monetized 2 3 CO2 damage costs in different world regions with
full PPP correction
Fankhauser Tol
bn$ %GDPa bn$ %GDPa
European Union 63.6 1.4
United States 61.0 1.3
Other OECD 55.9 1.2
OECD America 74.5 1.5
OECD Europe 57.4 1.6
OECD Pacific 60.7 3.8
Total OECD 180.5 1.3 192.7 1.9
E. Europe/Former USSR 29.8b 0.4b 214.8 20.4
Centrally Planned Asia 50.7c 2.9c 24.0 20.1
South and South East Asia 92.2 5.3
Africa 46.4 6.9
Latin America 40.3 3.1
Middle East 11.5 5.5
Total Non-OECD 141.6 0.9 172.8 1.7
World 322.0 1.1 364.4 1.8
a Purchasing power parity corrected GDP; note that the GDP base may differ
between the studies
b Former Soviet Union only
c China only
Source: Fankhauser and Tol (1997), based on Fankhauser (1995a), and Tol (1995).
2 3 CO2 on a society with today’s structure. Vulnerability is likely to
change as regions develop and population grows, but the direction of
this change is unclear because increased risks could be more than offset
by adaptation.
In recent work carried out subsequent to the SAR, Mendelsohn and
Neumann (1997) suggest that, at least in the market sector in the USA, cli-
mate change may have net benefits, contrary to the general thrust of Pearce
et al. (1996). Budyko (1996) shares this opinion. In yet unpublished work,
Mendelsohn et al. (1996) extend the US analysis to the world, finding a net
benefit for the world as a whole, but a loss in less developed countries.
Despite these discrepancies and the above shortcomings, available figures
give a rough indication of the possible order of magnitude of 2 3 CO2 im-
pact and the relative vulnerability of various regions. One result that
appears relatively robust is the higher vulnerability of developing coun-
tries compared to developed regions (see Tables 1 and 2). Reasons for this
difference include the greater importance of agriculture in these countries1
the lower level of public health and the tighter financial, institutional and
knowledge constraints on adaptation. Below, we ignore the international
study of Mendelsohn et al. (1997) because it is restricted to market sectors,
whereas most of the discussion is on non-market goods and services.
3. Valuation issues
As the previous section makes clear, greenhouse damage estimates still
have a number of limitations. This paper concentrates on shortcomings
related to the economic valuation of impacts, although issues such as the
lack or limited quality of physical impact data (and hence the comprehen-
siveness of the estimates), the limited treatment of uncertainty and the
artificial nature of the 2 3 CO2 scenario are arguably at least as important.
Economic valuation, particularly valuation of human mortality risks, has
been at the centre of the debate on the IPCC ‘social cost’ chapter.
A number of issues concern valuation techniques as such. The first is the
choice between the two concepts of willingness to pay (WTP) and willing-
ness to accept compensation (WTA), which in the case of climate change is
essentially an issue of property rights. A second issue is the question of
benefit transfer, which asks how estimates for one region or one problem
area can be extrapolated to another. A third issue concerns the incorpora-
tion of equity issues into the comparison and aggregation of estimates.
This section deals with each of these points in turn.
3.1 Willingness to pay vs willingness to accept
It is a well known empirical fact that economic values derived under a
WTP framework tend to differ from estimates that measure the same dam-
age using WTA. The latter can be several times higher. Bateman and
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1 With the exception of Darwin et al. (1995), agricultural studies continue to suggest
predominantly negative impacts in developing countries, although certain coun-
tries could benefit. The Darwin et al. study has not yet been taken up in aggregate
impact assessments.
Turner (1993), for example, report ratios of WTA over WTP ranging from
1.6 to 6.5. Various reasons for this discrepancy have been advanced (see,
for example Coursey et al., 1987; Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; and
Hahnemann, 1991), but the issue remains unresolved—some argue the dif-
ference to be largely a measurement error; some see it as a genuine effect.
For practical reasons, Arrow et al. (1993) have recommended the use of
WTP for contingent valuation studies, since they tend to produce more re-
liable results. They also indicate, however, that contingent valuation tends
to overestimate the true WTP.
The choice between WTP and WTA constitute an implicit statement
about prevailing property rights, and this is sometimes used as a guideline
for the choice of concept. By using WTP, i.e., asking people how much they
would pay to avoid adverse impacts, a changing climate is implicitly
chosen as the reference scenario. People do not have a ‘right’ to the climate
currently observed, but have to pay to obtain it. Conversely, by using
WTA, the assumption is that people are entitled to a preindustrial climate
(and standard of living?) or at the least the current climate plus, perhaps,
warming that has already been committed. WTA then estimates the reim-
bursement needed to compensate for damage arising from alterations to
the baseline climate.
However, the appropriate allocation of property rights (and thus the
choice between WTP and WTA) in the case of climate change is unclear.
On the one hand, the right of future generations to a functioning environ-
ment seems hard to question and is at the core of such notions as
sustainable development. This would point toward the use of WTA (as-
suming that climate change is predominantly harmful): future generations
have to be compensated for a climate-change-induced deterioration in
their living standards. On the other hand, an equally strong case can be
made for the right of developing countries to increase their standard of liv-
ing, which for all realistic scenarios implies increased baseline warming,2
and hence the use of WTP. A proponent of this second view is Schelling
(1995), who also stresses the need to be consistent between concern about
the enhanced greenhouse effect (which will mainly affect the future poor)
and concern for the fate of today’s poor. The issue of property rights re-
mains unresolved.
In practice, WTP and WTA are often mixed up in actual valuation. This
is particularly the case for climate change damages, where the limited
number of original studies make it necessary to use whatever information
is available, often resorting to benefit transfer. Consequently, estimates
tend to be a blend of various approaches, although WTP is perhaps more
frequently used. Most estimates in the literature were derived with the
benefits of emission reductions in mind, and consequently took business-
as-usual climate change as the starting point, asking people about their
WTP to obtain a deviation. WTA has also been used, however, as have
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2 Even if developed countries substantially reduced their greenhouse gas
emissions, developing countries could not increase their living standards to, say,
today’s OECD level without a further increase in atmospheric carbon concen-
tration.
been a number of second-best measures that were used as approximations
in the absence of primary studies. Estimates for the value of a statistical life
(VOSL), for example, were derived from a series of predominantly WTA
studies (wage-risk studies).
VOSL measures people’s attitude to mortality risk. However, an in-
creased risk of death from the point of view of the individual translates
into a higher number of casualties from the point of view of society. If
100,000 people are exposed to a 1/100,000 risk of premature death, there
will, statistically, be one such death. Suppose that each individual has to be
compensated by $15 to  be willing to accept this risk. The total compensa-
tion needed is then $15 3 100,000 5 $1.5m, for a risk equivalent to one
statistical death. This is referred to as the ‘value of statistical life’ (VOSL).
Notice that VOSL is effectively an aggregation rule, a way of adding up in-
dividuals’ valuation of risk. It is not the value of a ‘life’.
At least as far as the current generation of impact estimates is concerned,
the distinction between WTP and WTA is thus blurred. Nevertheless, the
issue is important conceptually and it is likely to  become increasingly rel-
evant as refinements in damage analysis take place and additional studies
are undertaken.
3.2 Benefit transfer and scaling by income
Since primary WTP/WTA data for climate change impacts are still scarce,
the damage-cost literature relies heavily on what is called benefit transfer.
The term refers to an often used short-cut in valuation, in which
WTP/WTA results (‘environmental benefits’) obtained in one study are
transferred to a new problem and another site. For the assessment of cli-
mate-change-induced mortality risk, for example, per-unit values were
‘transferred’ from a wide range of VOSL studies in various developed
countries, most of them using wage differentials (a WTA procedure called
the hedonic approach, see, e.g., Viscusi, 1993)
Benefit transfer is not without problems. Estimates are often site- or
problem-specific and hence difficult to transfer. In the case of climate-
change-induced mortality, for example, the underlying study and the
climate-change application differ both with respect to the analysed hazard
and the socio-economic groups exposed. Primary studies are mostly con-
cerned with occupational hazard, while climate-change-related risks
primarily relate to extreme weather events, heat stress an other climate-de-
pendent diseases. It is well known that people have a different WTP/WTA
depending on the type of hazard—for example, whether it is natural or
man-made, voluntarily taken or imposed by others. It is also conceivable
that the WTP/WTA of the elderly, who will be most at risk from climate-
change-related heat stress, is different from that of workers in the prime of
their life, who are the main victims of occupational hazard. For other cli-
mate-change-related risks (e.g., malaria, or extreme events), the
WTP/WTA may be different again.
To take such effects into account, the values from the underlying study
should ideally be corrected for differences in site and socio-economic con-
ditions. Even so, the accuracy of benefit transfer remains open to question.
In a direct test of the method, Bergland et al. (1995), for example, found a
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statistically significant difference between estimates based on benefit
transfer and the results from a primary study. Alberini et al. (1995), on the
other hand, secure a consistent set of results for contingent valuation and
income-adjusted benefit transfer in a study on morbidity in Taiwan.
If these problems are borne in mind, transferred estimates can provide
useful ballpark figures, and the method is often used in situations where
the accuracy sought does not justify the costs of a primary study. As for
climate change, the use of benefit transfer is primarily necessitated by the
absence of primary studies for a large number of countries and impact
categories.
In most climate change impact studies, per-unit value estimates were
more or less directly transferred from the study site. The only major ad-
justment made concerned income, which is one of the main explanatory
variables for both WTP and WTA. A standard assumption is that
WTP/WTA is an increasing function of income.3 A rich person would nor-
mally be willing (and able) to make a higher payment, in absolute terms,
than a poor person. By the same token, a compensation of, say $1,000 will
appear less attractive to a rich person than to a poor individual. The dam-
age studies reviewed in Pearce et al. (1996) therefore usually scale per-unit
values according to income, i.e. they use lower values in low-income coun-
tries. A possible benefit transfer function is
Vj 5 Vi(Yj/Yi)
b
where subscript j denotes the new application where the value is ‘trans-
ferred’ to, and i the original study site. V denotes the WTP/WTA estimate,
Y is per capita income, and b is a scaling parameter, i.e., the income elas-
ticity of marginal utility or the income elasticity of demand. Although
there is clear empirical evidence for an income effect, little is known about
its magnitude and scaling is correspondingly controversial. Most of the
studies surveyed in Pearce et al. (1996) assume an income elasticity of
WTP/WTA of 1, or slightly higher, following an early study by Pearce
(1980). That is, WTP/WTA as proportions of income are identical across
individuals. If a rich person is willing to pay, say, 5% of his income for an
environmental good, a poor person would equally be willing to spend 5%
of his.
Recent results cast doubt on the assumption of a unitary income elas-
ticity of WTP/WTA, suggesting an income elasticity of less than one
(Flores and Carson, 1997; Kriström and Riera, 1996; see also Krupnick et al.,
1996). Given the logic of scaling, a lower income elasticity would imply
that damages in developing countries were underestimated initially. (The
estimates for developed countries are not affected, since they are the sub-
ject of the original study.) The evidence is not yet conclusive. In the case of
mortality risk, the few available studies that directly estimate the VOSL in
developing countries all came up with substantially lower values than
would be obtained through benefit transfer. Thus, Parikh et al. (1994)
found VOSLs in Bombay of $25,000 using the human capital approach;
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3 Although the theoretical work of Flores and Carson (1997) does not exclude the
possibility of a negative correlation.
$20,000 using the wage differential approach and $15,000 based on the
Indian Workman’s Compensation Act. Da Motta et al. (1993) find a VOSL
of $15,000 using the human capital approach in Brazil. For comparison,
the lowest VOSL assumed in the IPCC social cost chapter is $150,000. The
IPCC value is based on an elasticity of WTP/WTA of about one. The
Brazilian and Indian evidence would thus imply an elasticity much greater
than one. It is worth noting, though, that the human capital approach is
largely discredited as an approach to estimating VOSLs (Freeman, 1993). It
is also well known that WTP/WTA is likely to exceed the expected value
of forgone earnings. It is therefore likely that the Brazilian study has un-
derestimated the true VOSL.
Better information is clearly needed in this area. At the same time, it
should be recalled that the question of the income elasticity of WTP/WTA
has arisen only because of the absence of original impact research, which
necessitated the use of benefit transfer. Although benefit transfer is likely
to continue to be important, primary studies directly concerned with the
valuation of climate change impact are therefore at least as important as
refinements in benefit transfer. With an increasing number of such studies,
issues of benefit transfer will automatically become less relevant. In the
meantime, and until clear empirical evidence becomes available, it will be
important for subsequent impact assessments to explore the sensitivity of
estimates to crucial parameters such as the income elasticity of
WTP/WTA.
3.3 Equity weighting
A central feature of the WTP/WTA concept is the key role it assigns to
individual preferences. The underlying ethical position is that the value of
goods should be set according to people’s own appreciation of them. At
the same time, the socio-economic situation from which people make their
assessment is taken as given. This can lead to problems if the currently ob-
served situation (say, the distribution of income) is considered to be unfair.
WTP/WTA estimates, because they are a function of socio-economic
characteristics, will automatically reflect this unfairness. For this reason,
some authors have called for the use of uniform per-unit damage values
(see Section 4). The issue is not new, however, and has a long history in
cost–benefit analysis (see, e.g., Pearce, 1986). The solution offered by wel-
fare economics is not to use uniform per-unit values, but to weight
individual estimates by a corrective factor that adjusts values for inequali-
ties in the income distribution. These ‘equity weights’ are usually derived
from a social welfare function. Consequently they strongly depend on the
analyst’s or policy makers’ value judgment and on the welfare function
they endorse. Since there is no universally valid welfare function, it fol-
lows that there is no unique set of equity weights.
None of the estimates in Pearce et al. (1996) was equity-weighted, al-
though the chapter did show very clearly how such equity weighting
could be carried out. In addition, equity was the subject of two separate
chapters in the SAR: Banuri et al. (1996), and Arrow et al. (1996).
Unfortunately, none of these chapters pursued the issue of equity weight-
ing. In Fankhauser et al. (1997), we have filled this gap and calculated
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equity weights and the corresponding damage figures for a variety of
possible welfare and utility functions. A selection of results is reproduced
in Table 3. As the table makes clear, estimates are highly sensitive to the as-
sumed welfare concept.
4. The pursuit of uniform per-unit values
Perhaps the main objection to the damage numbers reported in the IPCC
WGIII SAR was the fact that most studies used regionally differentiated
per-unit values—a common practice in valuation and a direct consequence
of the WTP/WTA approach (see Section 3). The regional assessment was
included in Pearce et al. (1996) not least in order to emphasize the differ-
ences in vulnerability. It was also expected that regionalized estimates
would be closer to the reality of national decision makers. Nevertheless,
some critics considered the notion of regionally differentiated values as
unethical, particularly in the context of increased mortality risks.
In the course of the debate, several alternatives were put forward, gen-
erally aiming at an uniform valuation of mortality risks for all individuals.
The most important suggestions are discussed below.
4.1 Averaging
WTP/WTA estimates do not only differ between nations, but also between
different socio-economic groups within one country. A pragmatic ap-
proach to valuation that is sometimes taken in a national context is to use
nationally averaged per-unit values for everybody. The UK Department
for Transport, for example, has long used a standardized VOSL in road
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Table 3. Equity-weighted climate change damage costs
Fankhauser (1995a) Tol (1995)
Uncorrected impacta 322.0 364.4
Utilitarian Welfare Function
e 5 0.0b 322.0 364.4
e 5 0.5 315.6 411.4
e 5 1.0 405.2 614.3
e 5 1.5 621.9 1057.6
e 5 2.0 1041.7 1930.0
Bernoulli–Nash Welfare Functionc 405.2 614.3
Maximum Welfare Function
e 5 0.0 50.7 46.4
e 5 0.5 95.8 89.4
e 5 1.0 181.0 172.2
e 5 1.5 342.7 331.8
e 5 2.0 646.5 639.3
a As in Table 2.
b e denotes the income elasticity of marginal utility (parameter of the utility
function).
c Bernoulli–Nash weights are independent of e, and correspond to the case e
5 1 of the utilitarian welfare function.
Source: Fankhauser et al. (1997), based on indicated sources.
construction appraisal. This VOSL is based on surveys of the literature per-
taining to Europe and North America, although the current (1996)
valuation of about US$1.2 million is acknowledged to be well below the
average arising from such studies (about US$2.5 million). With this
method, it is recognized that some affected groups may have a higher
WTP/WTA than others. However, for ease of calculation and to assure the
acceptability of the assessment to all stakeholders, uniform values are used
for all population groups. Moreover, if necessary, compensatory policies to
restore inequities resulting from such valuation may be installed.
For the same reason of acceptability, the use of uniform, globally aver-
aged values has also been advocated for the assessment of
climate-change-induced mortality risks (and also for other impact cat-
egories). In Tables 4 and 5 we have calculated the mortality damage that
would result from such a method. As expected, averaging leads to lower
damages in high-income regions, where per-unit damage values are above
world average, and to higher damage in low-income regions, where per-
unit values are below world average.
The most striking result is that, abstracting from rounding effects, the re-
vised figures for global mortality damage remain unchanged compared to
the initial figures reported in Pearce et al. (1996). The reason for this lies in
a crucial assumption made by both Fankhauser (1995a) and Tol (1995). In
both studies mortality is assumed to be directly proportional to popu-
lation. That is, the number of climate-change statistical deaths per
thousand people is identical in each region and averaging therefore has no
effect on total damage.4 The linearity assumption on mortality changes
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4 Let m be the fraction of the population affected by climate change. By assumption
m is identical for all regions. If pi denotes the population of region i, the number
Table 4. Mortality costs with regionally differentiated, globally averaged and
maximum per-unit values—Fankhauser (1995a) assessment
Regiona Deaths VOSLb Loss VOSLc Loss VOSLd Loss
(103) (106$) (109$) (106$) (109) (106$) (109$)
EU 9 1.50 13 0.35 3 1.50 13
USA 7 1.50 10 0.35 2 1.50 10
OOECD 8 1.50 12 0.35 3 1.50 12
fSU 8 0.30 2 0.35 3 1.50 12
China 30 0.10 3 0.35 11 1.50 45
RoW 85 0.13 11 0.35 30 1.50 127
World 120 0.35e 51f 0.35 51f 1.50 219f
a Acronyms stand for, respectively: European Union, United States of
America, Other member countries of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development, former Soviet Union, China and Rest of the
World.





was a reasonable ‘first cut’ at the time. More recent work on heat stress
(Kalkstein and Tan, 1995) and tropical diseases (e.g., Martens et al., 1994,
1995) demonstrates, however, that mortality changes are not likely to be
homogeneous over the globe. In that case, the use of average and re-
gionally differentiated per-unit values will  produce different results.
While the use of average values seems to be a pragmatic way forward in
general, a main problem with the method is that it may lead to inconsis-
tencies in the way locally and globally caused damages are measured.
Evidently, environmental problems of local origin, such as those related to
air pollution, would continue to be assessed at locally relevant per-unit
values. However, the result may then be large discrepancies in valuation,
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of casualties in that region is mpi. Let vi be the VOSL in region i, and v the globally
averaged value. Global damage using the average value, v, is thus Smpiv. This ex-












which is the expression for global damage using region-specific per-unit values.
In the case of benefit-transfers, one may prefer not to use the average of inferred
VOSLs, v, but the VOSL associated with the average per capita income. In this
case, a further condition is required for identity: VOSL has to be linear in income.
In Fankhauser (1995a) this is the case, while Tol (1995) assumes some modest non-
linearity—which explains the slight deviations in Table 5.
Table 5. Mortality costs with regionally differentiated, globally averaged and
maximum per-unit values—Tol (1995) Assessment.
Regiona Deaths VOSLb Loss VOSLc Loss VOSLd Loss
(103) (106$) (109$) (106$) (109$) (106$) (109$)
OECD-A 11 3.43 38 0.92 10 3.43 38
OECD-E 15 2.07 31 0.92 14 3.43 52
OECD-P 13 2.27 29 0.92 12 3.43 44
CEE&fSU 15 1.43 22 0.92 14 3.43 52
ME 2 0.31 1 0.92 2 3.43 6
LA 22 0.75 16 0.92 20 3.43 74
S&SEA 68 0.44 30 0.92 63 3.43 235
CPA 52 0.66 34 0.92 47 3.43 177
AFR 26 0.43 11 0.92 24 3.43 90
World 223 0.95e 211f 0.92 204f 3.43 766f
a Acronyms stand for, respectively, OECD-America, OECD-Europe, OECD-
Pacific, Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Middle
East, Latin America, South and Southeast Asia, Centrally Planned Asia and
Africa.
b As in original study, i.e., $250,000 plus 175 times the per capita income;
note that per capita income is here corrected for purchasing power parity.





Source: Own calculations based on indicated sources.
depending on the origin of the risk. The incremental mortality risk from
climate-change-induced malaria, for example, would be valued differently
to, say, the same increase in risk caused by deteriorating medical stan-
dards. Similarly, traffic-related mortality risks would be valued differently
to  heat-stress-related risks. This would not only be logically inconsistent,
but ultimately it may also lead to an unjustified reallocation of safety in-
vestments (e.g., for developing countries, an overinvestment in
greenhouse-gas emission reduction at the expense of, say, general im-
provements in health care; for developed countries, an underinvestment in
greenhouse-gas emission reduction to the benefit of, say, traffic safety).5
4.2 Maximum value
The use of global averages for VOSL in climate valuation studies would be
more or less consistent with national approaches to the use of nationally
averaged VOSLs. What would not be consistent, however, is the use of the
highest country-average VOSL for the world. This approach has been rec-
ommended by Meyer and Cooper (1995), on the grounds that no other
value would be acceptable to the country with the highest VOSL. The last
columns of Tables 4 and 5 show what would happen to mortality damage
if this principle was adopted.
However, the Meyer and Cooper argument is untenable, for the same
reasons that mar the use of average values, except that the case against
maximum values is much stronger. Using a maximum value for a statisti-
cal life would lead to an overemphasis of climate-change-related mortality
risks compared to other mortality risks for all countries but the one with
the highest VOSL. Moreover, if use of the highest value were justified, it
would have to apply within a country as well, i.e., the single individual
with the highest valuation would dictate all values; equity within a nation
should not be different to equity between nations.
4.3 Historical responsibility and polluter pays
The uniform use of per-unit values at OECD levels has also been advo-
cated by Ekins (1995) and Hohmeyer and Gärtner (1992). In an aberration
of the polluter-pays principle, these authors argue that, because OECD
countries are predominantly responsible for the accumulation of green-
house gases in the atmosphere, it is justifiable to value all damages at the
per-unit values observed in these countries.
There is a series of problems with this approach. Perhaps the main one
is the unfortunate combination of valuation (which, although grounded on
value judgements and intertwined with politics, is essentially a techni-
cal–empirical matter) with the political question of equity and
compensation. What the polluter-pays principle provides is a rule about
the direction of compensation payments (from the polluter to the victim),
and that payments should somehow reflect inflicted damages. It does not,
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5 The optimality of investment is considered from a global point of view. Because
climate change is a global externality and benefits will predominantly occur else-
where, domestic decision makers have an additional incentive to underinvest in
climate change prevention.
however, provide a methodology to determine these damages. For this it
relies on conventional valuation techniques.
A second problem with the approach is that it reverses common practice
in litigation cases, where compensatory payments are determined accord-
ing to the damage suffered by the victim. Instead, the approach suggested
by Ekins and Hohmeyer and Gärtner determines damage as the welfare
loss the offender would have suffered, had he been the victim. This has  no
counterpart in domestic or international law. Clearly, what matters is the
damage suffered by the victim.
A third, more practical problem is that impact estimates now crucially
depend on who is perceived to be responsible for which part of the in-
flicted damage. Assigning responsibility, however, is a complicated
matter. The facts may be clear at first sight—OECD countries have con-
tributed most to the accumulation of greenhouse gases in the
atmosphere—but on closer consideration the case is not so straightfor-
ward. For example, to what extent can countries be held responsible for
actions, the consequences of which they were not aware of? Should they
have been aware of Svante Arrhenius’s work on the subject a hundred
years ago? Is collective responsibility the same as individual responsi-
bility? Could early greenhouse-gas abatement have created other
problems? How should these be taken into account, if at all? What happens
in the near future when developing countries become the predominant
emitters of greenhouse gases?
It is not the purpose of this paper to enter into this debate. The point we
want to make, though, is twofold. First, the concept of responsibility de-
pends strongly on the ethical position of the person, nation or generation
affected by climate change, as well as on whether this person, nation or
generation is guided by what is or by what ought to be. Second, an open
debate about accountability is clearly necessary, but responsibility, how-
ever it is apportioned, does not determine the welfare loss people will
suffer.
For the purpose of illustration and sensitivity analysis, we have never-
theless calculated the ‘damages’ that would result from the Ekins and
Hohmeyer/Gaertner approach. Contrary to these authors, however, we ac-
knowledge the difficulties in assigning responsibility and work with
different assumptions on accountability. The results are provided in Table
6. We distinguish between OECD countries only and the Annex I countries
of the Climate Convention (approximated in the calculations as OECD
plus countries of the former Soviet Union). The table also distinguishes be-
tween various degrees of responsibility. The rich region (OECD/Annex I)
is either held fully responsible for all damages, or for its own damages plus
a fraction of damage in poor countries determined by its historic contribu-
tion to greenhouse-gas emissions.
In Table 6, the first column reproduces the Fankhauser damage esti-
mates of Table 2. The next two columns re-estimate ‘damage’ on the
assumption that impacts for which the rich region is responsible are val-
ued at the average per-unit values of that region. In the second column, the
rich region is held responsible for all impacts, and hence all ‘damage’ in the
poor region is valued at the level of the rich. In the third column the rich
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region is only partially accountable for damages in the poor region. World
‘damage’ estimates increase by about a factor 2.5 to 4 as a consequence of
these assumptions. ‘Damages’ in developing countries increase by an even
larger factor. It is important to note that these figures are based on a
method that has little meaning in terms of welfare economics. Perhaps its
main disadvantage is that the method no longer reflects the actual welfare
loss people will face.
The last three columns of Table 6 adopt a definition of the polluter-pays
principle that is closer to the usual interpretation of the concept. ‘Polluter
pays’ is now assumed to mean that responsible regions compensate others
for inflicted damage.6 The table shows the total cost each region would
incur under this regime. Costs consist of self-inflicted damages plus com-
pensation paid, minus compensation received. Damage is again valued at
regional per-unit values for this exercise, and world damage therefore re-
mains unaltered, compared to Table 2. In column four, the rich are held
accountable for all the damage suffered anywhere in the world, and hence
meet all damage costs. Net costs to the poor drop to zero. In column five,
the rich are held partially accountable (and hence only partially compen-
sate) for damage in poor regions. The sixth column analyses reciprocal
responsibility. That is, the rich compensate the poor, and the poor the rich
according to their respective contributions to the enhanced greenhouse ef-
fect. This last (rather hypothetical) scenario provides results closest to the
original figures.
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6 Note that the capital transfers do not necessarily result in an overall benefit for the
compensated party.
Table 6. Fankhauser’s estimates for different positions on valuation and
accountability (damage as percentage of GDP)
Region Originala Valuationb Accountabilityc
Alld 64/84e Alld 64/84e 64/84f
OECD 1.36 1.36 1.36 2.42 2.04 1.55
Non-OECD 0.86 6.86 4.39 0.00 0.31 0.70
World 1.08 4.41 3.04 1.08 1.08 1.08
Annex-I 0.99 0.99 0.99 1.52 1.44 1.28
Non-Annex 1.29 7.77 6.52 0.00 0.21 0.60
World 1.08 2.96 2.60 1.08 1.08 1.08
a As in Table 2.
b Values in the poor region (non-OECD and non-Annex, respectively) are
adjusted to the values in the rich region (using factors 8 and 6, respectively).
c The rich region (OECD and Annex-I, respectively) compensates the poor
region for damage suffered from climate change.
d Damages adjusted or compensated for all impacts in poor countries.
e Damages adjusted or compensated for 64 per cent (non-OECD) or 84 per
cent (non-Annex I) in poor countries. The OECD and Annex-I contributed an
estimated 64 per cent and 84 per cent, respectively, to accumulated carbon
dioxide emissions from industrial sources (Gruebler and Nakicenovic, 1991).
f Rich and poor regions are each held accountable according to their
respective contributions as per note e.
Source: Own calculations based on indicated sources.
For simplicity, the results in Table 6 are all based on the regions’ shares
in the accumulated greenhouse gas emissions up to 1990 (instead of the
year in which 2 3 CO2 is expected to occur). This biases the assessment in
favour of developing countries, whose emissions are growing faster than
those of developed countries. That is, their share in future emissions is
higher than it was in the past.
4.4 Differentiated values and intergenerational equity
The motives for uniform valuation discussed above largely relate to intra-
generational equity. Orthogonal to this issue is that of intergenerational
equity. The matter of uniformity of differentiation of values becomes more
complicated when one considers the intertemporal consequences of the
various positions. Schelling (1995) argues that the rules applied to intra-
generational issues should also hold for intergenerational issues.
If one allows differentiation in VOSLs between countries, there seems
little reason not to allow differentiation across generations. According to
the WTP/WTA logic outlined earlier, one would expect VOSLs to increase
over time as per capita income grows. At the same time, mortality losses
can be discounted back to their net present value without methodological
difficulties, since damages are equivalent to the compensation requested
by future generations, or to the income they are willing to forego to avoid
damages.
If equity concerns are taken into account by using averages or maximum
values, the choice of time horizon becomes an issue. If the practice is to
take averages across an entire decision-making unit (e.g., a country), pre-
sumably one would also have to take averages over several time periods.
How the relevant time horizon would or should be defined is, however,
unclear. In the case of a global average, the relevant time horizon may ar-
guably be ‘the whole future’. In addition to questions of definition, the
more practical issue would be to construct institutions that guarantee that
the abstract notion of ‘concern for the whole future’ is also operationalized
in a meaningful way.
5. On the meaning and usefulness of economic values
Economic valuation is by and large associated with cost–benefit analysis
(CBA). Authors who oppose CBA have therefore rejected valuation studies
as redundant. It is not the purpose of this paper to discuss the merits and
shortcomings of CBA, although we are of the opinion that a systematic and
careful comparison of monetized ‘pros’ and ‘cons’ can produce important
insights to decision makers. On the other hand, we would also subscribe to
the view that no single approach can produce all the answers. The point to
make here, however, is that monetary impact estimates can be useful also
outside a CBA context. Even if CBA is pursued, Pearce (1997) argues that
the information in the IPCC SAR is sufficient to indicate that much
stronger climate controls are called for than currently observed, i.e., ben-
efits of stronger controls exceed the costs. Critics of the SAR must therefore
also be faulted for rejecting the CBA approach without investigating what
it implied.
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5.1 Sustainability
Knowledge about the monetary value of climate change impacts is needed
for some interpretations of sustainable development, for example.
Sustainability is one of the most prominent notions suggested to guide de-
cision makers (e.g., Howarth and Monahan, 1992). In the economic
literature, sustainability is often interpreted to mean a non-decreasing util-
ity level over time (see, e.g., Pezzey, 1989). Hamilton and Ulph (1995)
analysed the conditions needed to maintain a non-decreasing utility level
in the case of climate change, following the work of Hartwick (1977, 1978)
on the sustainable use of renewable resources. According to the modified
Hartwick rule derived by Hamilton and Ulph, (weak) sustainability is ob-
tained if investment in each period is equal to the rent on extracted
resources, net of the optimal carbon tax yields (the tax needed for emis-
sions to follow an optimal trajectory), plus the value of the change in the
atmospheric carbon stock. If this condition holds, utility will be constant
over time; that is, future generations will be equally as well off as the cur-
rent generation. Although there are many other interpretations of
sustainability, the example shows that the notion does not necessarily pre-
clude the need for valuation. In order to implement the Hamilton/Ulph
rule, information is needed about the economic value of atmospheric car-
bon, i.e., information about the marginal damage caused by a tonne of
emission.
5.2 Impact estimates as inputs to negotiations
Climate change has a variety of impacts, even within a single country. One
of the advantages of valuation is that it summarizes the available impact
information in a consistent manner. One obvious way to make use of im-
pact estimates could therefore be to use them as inputs in the negotiations
for a climate change protocol. In this scenario, impact estimates are not
used in a decision support system like CBA, but provide background in-
formation for decision makers. Roughly, negotiations could then be
modelled as follows. Each party comes to the negotiations equipped with
a climate-change damage function for its territory (measured according to
the WTP/WTA of its own people), as well as its mitigation cost function,
an emission inventory and any other relevant information. On the basis of
this information parties can negotiate on mitigation and compensation
levels. For each proposal (derived, e.g., from equity arguments such as his-
torical responsibility) it is then possible to calculate the welfare impacts for
each party, and this in turn will help parties to determine whether a par-
ticular proposal is acceptable, whether it is consistent with equity
requirements, and so on.
It is clear that to serve this information purpose, impact estimates would
have to reflect the actual regional welfare effects as adequately as possible.
They would have to be descriptive in the sense that they take observed
facts (e.g., income differences) as given. At the same time, they would have
to be objective. Countries would clearly have a strategic interest in esti-
mates that improve their bargaining position. Given the high uncertainty
in impact assessment, there is a danger that the estimates themselves may
become the subject of negotiations. Arguably, this process can to some ex-
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tent already be observed in the discussions on the IPCC social cost chapter
(Pearce et al., 1996). Although many critics had genuine concerns, there
was a tendency for groups to push for estimates that would lend support
to the climate policy of their choice. In this situation, ‘objective’ estimates
by an impartial body such as the IPCC may serve a useful function. The re-
gional impact estimates of Pearce et al. (1996) should be understood as a
first attempt in this direction.
6. Conclusions
The chapter on the social costs of climate change has been one of the most
controversial in the IPCC SAR. The purpose of this paper is to discuss
some of the main objections raised in the IPCC review process and to show
what implications they would have on damage estimation.
The economic valuation of climate change impacts is difficult. As stated
in the social cost chapter itself, available figures are still incomplete and
have to be interpreted with care. Nevertheless, we would argue that mon-
etary estimates of climate impacts can provide useful information to
decision makers. We have argued that monetary estimates may serve a
useful purpose whether they are used in a cost–benefit context or not.
However, to be credible, such estimates need to be based on a sound
theoretical framework and make use of the best estimation techniques
available at the time. In our opinion, ad hoc methods such as valuation ac-
cording to historical responsibility or valuation at the highest observed
level do not meet this requirement. Neither of them has sound theoretical
foundations and conceptual problems abound. Although not without
problems, the WTP/WTA method is the best technique currently avail-
able.
Issues of rights and responsibilities are clearly important and finding the
right answer to these questions will be crucial for a successful climate
change policy—for the discussion of compensation schemes as well as for
the allocation of the abatement burden. However, this by no means implies
that economic valuation, too, should be a political process, as some sources
have asserted (e.g., the equity chapter in the IPCC WGII SAR—Banuri et
al., 1996). It is true that valuation theory (like consumer theory) is based on
a series of axioms with which not everybody may agree. It is also the case
that people’s perceptions about rights and duties will influence their
WTP/WTA. In that sense economic valuation is ‘political’. But this does
not mean that damage valuation should become the subject of nego-
tiations. Economic values reflect people’s preferences and, although
preferences can be influenced in a variety of ways, they cannot be deter-
mined in intergovernmental negotiations. Rather, one would expect the
converse to be true: that a country’s negotiating position is determined by
the preferences of its people. This paper shows how sensitive impact esti-
mates are to politically inspired alternatives.
To serve a useful purpose, damage figures have to be of sufficient
quality and be firmly based on empirical work. There is a clear need for im-
proved estimates in that respect. Primary studies that value the impacts of
climate change directly are particularly needed. Current assessments use
benefit transfer. Valuation studies are especially needed for non-market
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impacts (e.g., on health, human amenity and natural ecosystems), and with
respect to impacts in developing countries. The more primary studies are
available, the less analysts will have to rely on difficult and controversial
benefit transfers. Nevertheless, climate change impacts are so numerous
and diverse that the extrapolation of case-study results is likely to remain
an important technique for the foreseeable future. The credibility of such
results will largely depend on the care with which estimates are trans-
ferred from one study site to another.
It should also be recalled that, in addition to valuation issues, impact es-
timates suffer from a number of limitations not related to valuation.
Improvements are also needed in that respect. Among the most important
research topics are the need to move from equilibrium (2 3 CO2) to tran-
sient or dynamic damage analysis (amongst others to properly estimate
marginal impacts), and the need for a better understanding of adaptations.
As research is moving in this direction, the Third Assessment Report of the
IPCC will hopefully be in a position to provide better-quality (and less
controversial) estimates.
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